

Gas Detectors and Their Place in Occupational Hygiene: Misinterpretation, Misuse, and the Path to Better Practice

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1. Introduction

Real-time gas monitoring has become a cornerstone of modern occupational hygiene and safety practice. Portable and fixed gas detectors are now commonplace across industries ranging from energy and resources to utilities, manufacturing, and infrastructure. Concurrently, Australia's transition from Workplace Exposure Standards (WES) to the Workplace Exposure Limits (WEL) framework, applying from 1 December 2026, is prompting practitioners, consultants, and purchasing teams to examine more closely what direct-reading gas monitors must deliver in practice.

Yet despite widespread adoption of gas detection technology and a maturing regulatory environment, persistent confusion remains about what real-time readings represent and, critically, how alarms should be configured to support meaningful risk control. The instruments themselves have never been more capable; the problems lie not in the technology but in how it is understood, communicated, and applied.

In field practice, this gap between measurement capability and interpretation most commonly appears in a small number of recurring failure modes. Instantaneous alarms are frequently configured at, or directly derived from, eight-hour TWA values, resulting in nuisance alarms and alarm fatigue rather than meaningful early warning. Displayed TWA values are often treated as indicators of current atmospheric conditions, despite being lagging, cumulative metrics by definition. Procurement specifications increasingly require monitor readings to “resolve to 10% of the WEL” without clearly identifying whether this requirement relates to alarming, exposure assessment, or reporting confidence. Finally, the language used on detector displays frequently implies regulatory thresholds rather than decision triggers, encouraging debate and delay during alarm events rather than prompt protective action.

This paper examines interconnected issues that together account for much of the misuse and misinterpretation observed in practice. Section 2 establishes the technical foundation: what real-time sensors can and cannot tell us, and how modern gas detectors function. Section 3 sets out a risk-based alarm-setting philosophy grounded in occupational hygiene principles. Section 4 argues that the language used on gas detector displays is actively contributing to poor decision-making and proposes a terminology reform. Section 5 examines the specific question of sensor resolution and the widespread but often misapplied expectation that monitors must resolve to 10% of the applicable WEL. Section 6 suggests a methodology for setting alarm setpoints when considering extended work-shift.

Taken together, these areas point to a single underlying theme: that the value of real-time gas monitoring lies not in the numbers the instruments display, but in the quality of the decisions those numbers enable.

2. Real-Time Gas Monitoring: Capabilities, Limitations, and Alarm Functions

2.1: What real-time instruments can and cannot tell us

Real-time instruments provide near-continuous measurements, but they do not deliver perfect, instantaneous representations of exposure. Every sensor has response time, detection limits, resolution constraints, and susceptibility to environmental influences. Electrochemical sensors may take tens of seconds or longer to stabilise following a rapid concentration change. At low concentrations, instrument noise and rounding can dominate the displayed value. Cross-sensitivities, temperature, humidity, and sensor ageing further complicate interpretation.

For experienced practitioners, these limitations are well understood. The challenge arises when numerical outputs are treated as absolute truths rather than indicators requiring professional judgement. Nowhere is this more apparent than in alarm configuration.

2.2: The distinct purposes of exposure limits and alarm setpoints

Workplace Exposure Limits are health-based criteria designed to guide the assessment of exposure over defined averaging periods:

- TWA values reflect acceptable average exposure over an eight-hour working day.
- STEL values address short-term exposure, typically assessed over 15 minutes. A STEL must not be exceeded even where the eight-hour TWA remains acceptable.
- Peak or Ceiling limits apply to substances capable of causing harm from very brief exposures, where even short averaging periods would be too coarse.

Gas detector alarms, by contrast, are operational controls. Their role is to trigger timely action, investigation, ventilation, task modification, or evacuation, before harmful exposure occurs. They are not legal limits, and they are not compliance determinations.

Confusing these two functions leads to poor outcomes. Setting instantaneous alarms equal to an eight-hour TWA may appear conservative, but in practice it often generates nuisance alarms, accelerates alarm fatigue, and undermines confidence in monitoring systems. Equally problematic is the assumption that 'no alarm' means 'no risk'; alarms are thresholds on an instrument, not indicators of regulatory compliance.

Once the separation between exposure metrics and operational decision triggers is accepted, it becomes much harder to justify the common habit of treating the displayed TWA as though it were another form of instantaneous alarm indicator. The live reading, the STEL, and the TWA do not answer the same question and should not be used as though they do.

2.3: Alarm functions on modern personal gas detectors

Most contemporary personal gas detectors provide multiple alarm functions for each toxic channel. Table 1 summarises these functions and their intended roles.

Table 1. Alarm functions on modern personal gas detectors.

Alarm	Basis of Operation	Intended Use
Low (instantaneous) alarm — A1	Triggers when the current reading exceeds a lower threshold.	Early warning to prompt investigation, ventilation, or task modification.
High (instantaneous) alarm — A2	Triggers when the current reading exceeds a higher threshold.	Indicates a more serious situation requiring immediate action - often linked to STEL, a fraction of peak limitations, or a management-defined stop-work level.
TWA alarm	Based on the detector's running 8-hour TWA calculation since the instrument was activated or reset.	Triggers when the calculated TWA exceeds a configured limit - commonly aligned with, or below, the WEL TWA.
STEL alarm	Based on a rolling 15-minute (or configured) average.	Triggers when the 15-minute average exceeds the configured STEL alarm level, typically aligned with the WEL STEL.

It is important to note that oxygen and flammable gas channels sit outside the WEL framework entirely, relying on long-established industry conventions. For example, oxygen deficiency near 19.5% v/v, or flammable gas alarms at a defined fraction of the lower explosive limit. These should not be conflated with toxic gas exposure limits.

2.4: Reference WEL values for commonly monitored gases

Table 2 provides WEL values for a range of gas compounds for which real-time monitors are commercially available. These values are reproduced for reference only; practitioners should consult the current Safe Work Australia WEL framework directly, as values are subject to revision.

Table 2. Reference WEL values for commonly monitored gases (all values in ppm unless otherwise stated).

Gas Compound	CAS No.	Formula	TWA (ppm)	STEL (ppm)	Peak (ppm)
Ammonia	7664-41-7	NH ₃	20	35	—
Carbon Monoxide	630-08-0	CO	20	—	—
Chlorine	7782-50-5	Cl ₂	—	—	1
Chlorine Dioxide	10049-04-4	ClO ₂	0.1	0.3	—
Ethylene Oxide (ETO)	75-21-8	ETO	<i>Non-threshold genotoxic carcinogen</i>	—	—
Formaldehyde	50-00-0	HCHO	1	2	—
Hydrogen Chloride	7647-01-0	HCl	—	—	2
Hydrogen Cyanide	74-90-8	HCN	—	—	10
Hydrogen Fluoride	7664-39-3	HF	0.5	—	2
Hydrogen Peroxide	7722-84-1	H ₂ O ₂	0.5	—	2
Hydrogen Sulphide	7783-06-4	H ₂ S	10	15	—
Methyl Mercaptan	74-93-1	CH ₃ SH	0.5	—	—
Nitric Oxide	10102-43-9	NO	2	—	—
Nitrogen Dioxide	10102-44-0	NO ₂	3	5	—
Ozone	10028-15-6	O ₃	—	—	0.1
Phosgene	75-44-5	COCl ₂	0.1	0.4	—
Phosphine	7803-51-2	PH ₃	0.05	—	0.15
Silane	7803-62-5	SiH ₄	5	—	—
Sulphur Dioxide	7446-09-5	SO ₂	—	0.25	—

3. Alarm-Setting Philosophy: A Risk-Based Framework

Alarm setpoints are operational controls, not exposure limits. Their purpose is to prompt timely action that prevents harmful exposure, not to declare compliance or non-compliance with a WEL. A defensible alarm-setting philosophy rests on six principles.

3.1: Match the alarm type to the risk being managed

Modern gas detectors provide multiple alarm functions for a reason. Instantaneous alarms (A1/A2) manage acute and rapidly developing risks. TWA alarms manage cumulative exposure across a shift. STEL alarms manage short-term exposure where defined. No single alarm can address all exposure scenarios. Attempting to do so almost always leads to either alarm fatigue or under-protection.

3.2: Avoid equating instantaneous alarms to exposure limits

Exposure limits are health-based assessment criteria defined over specific averaging periods. Alarm setpoints are decision triggers. Setting instantaneous alarms equal to an eight-hour TWA is technically unsound and often counterproductive. Where a substance has a defined STEL or Peak limit, alarm philosophy is relatively straightforward: alarms should be configured to support staying below those limits, with early warning provided well in advance.

For substances where only a TWA exists, best practice is to treat alarm settings as risk management tools, not mathematical transformations of an averaging figure. A valid approach is to set low instantaneous alarms at levels that provide early warning of deteriorating conditions, often modestly above the TWA, and high instantaneous alarms at levels that clearly demand intervention while remaining well below any excursion thresholds or known acute effect levels.

3.3: Treat excursion guidance as an outer boundary, not an alarm target

Where a gas has no STEL or Peak limit, Australian guidance notes refer to short-term excursion criteria, including references to three or five times the TWA, when assessing whether a process is under reasonable control. These criteria are frequently misunderstood and misapplied.

Excursion guidance exists to support exposure assessment and process evaluation. It does not define acceptable instantaneous concentrations, and it was never intended as a formula for programming alarms into gas detectors. Treating these values as alarm setpoints effectively shifts the trigger point to where control has already been lost. For substances with significant acute toxicity or irritant properties, hydrogen sulphide, chlorine, ammonia, hydrogen fluoride, this approach is particularly unsafe. These gases can cause harm well below any excursion threshold derived from an eight-hour average. Alarms must be set below excursion boundaries so that corrective action occurs before control fails, not in response to that failure.

3.4: Apply greater conservatism for acutely toxic substances

Some substances demand conservatism regardless of how their exposure limits are expressed. Gases with strong irritant effects, rapid systemic toxicity, or sensory fatigue, such as hydrogen sulphide, chlorine, ammonia, and hydrogen fluoride, require lower instantaneous alarm thresholds than would be implied by TWA-based logic alone. Alarm philosophy must reflect toxicology, not just arithmetic. This is consistent with how major gas detector manufacturers configure default alarms and with how experienced hygienists apply professional judgement in the field.

Consider a workplace where ammonia is present intermittently during charging, maintenance, cleaning, or abnormal process conditions. Exposure may occur as short-duration releases rather than steady-state background concentrations. Ammonia is a strong sensory irritant, and worker response is often driven by discomfort, eye and respiratory irritation, and task disruption well before any eight-hour averaging criterion is approached.

In this context, alarm-setting begins by defining the purpose of each alarm function rather than by transforming exposure limits into instantaneous thresholds.

An early warning alarm is configured to indicate a deviation from normal conditions and to prompt timely investigation or corrective action, such as improving ventilation, adjusting work practices, or identifying a developing leak. This alarm is intended to activate before irritation becomes significant and before control is lost, providing time for intervention without unnecessary disruption.

A higher action alarm is configured to indicate a condition requiring immediate response, such as withdrawal from the area or cessation of the task. This alarm is set at a concentration that clearly signals loss of adequate control, while remaining well below levels associated with severe acute effects or reliance on short-term excursion criteria. Its purpose is not assessment, but decisive action.

A TWA alarm may also be retained, calculated using the instrument's standard running average, to provide cumulative exposure context across the shift. However, it is not relied upon as a real-time indicator of current atmospheric conditions, nor as the primary trigger for immediate protective action.

The benefit of this approach lies not in the specific numerical values selected, but in the documented alignment between alarm purpose, toxicological behaviour, instrument response characteristics, and the actions expected when each alarm activates.

This logic applies equally to other acutely toxic or irritating gases, such as chlorine, hydrogen sulphide, or hydrogen fluoride, where short-term peaks dominate risk and averaging logic plays a limited immediate protective role.

Consider a workplace where carbon monoxide may be present at low to moderate concentrations over extended periods, such as during internal combustion engine operation, furnace use, or poorly ventilated plant rooms. Unlike strongly irritating gases, carbon monoxide provides little sensory warning, and risk is driven primarily by cumulative uptake rather than short-duration peak exposure.

In this context, alarm-setting reflects the importance of recognising sustained elevation rather than brief excursions. Instantaneous alarms may still be configured to indicate abnormal conditions or equipment malfunction, but they play a secondary role to exposure-tracking functions.

A running TWA alarm is therefore retained as a primary control, providing early indication that cumulative exposure is increasing across the shift and allowing intervention before unacceptable dose accrues. A rolling short-term average may also be used to identify periods of elevated exposure that contribute disproportionately to cumulative dose.

The purpose of these alarms is not to assess compliance in real time, but to support earlier corrective action, such as improving ventilation, modifying work practices, or reducing source emissions, before cumulative exposure approaches health-based limits.

In contrast to acutely irritating gases, brief short-duration peaks that do not materially affect cumulative exposure are of less immediate concern, provided they are controlled and do not indicate a developing loss of control. The alarm philosophy therefore places greater weight on trend recognition and cumulative exposure management than on instantaneous concentration alone.

As with all alarm-setting decisions, defensibility lies in documenting the alignment between alarm purpose, toxicological behaviour, exposure pattern, and the actions expected when each alarm activates.

Together, these contrasting examples illustrate why alarm-setting cannot be reduced to a single rule or fraction of an exposure limit, and why hazard type must drive alarm philosophy.

3.5: Static and boundary monitoring: additional considerations

Fixed and boundary gas monitoring systems play a valuable role in detecting leaks, process upsets, and abnormal emissions. When configured correctly, they can also provide insight into spatial and temporal exposure patterns. However, boundary measurements are not breathing-zone measurements, and WELs are not environmental pollution standards.

When organisations choose to apply WEL-derived values to boundary alarms, the intent must be explicit: is the alarm signalling potential worker exposure, process deviation, or possible off-site migration? Equally important is ensuring that alarm averaging periods align with monitoring objectives. A boundary monitor intended to detect short-duration releases should not rely solely on an eight-hour averaging concept. Interpretation of these systems demands occupational hygiene expertise, not automated threshold logic.

3.6: Document the rationale

Alarm setpoints should always be traceable to: the applicable WEL framework; known toxicological behaviour; instrument capability and limitations; and the intended response to each alarm level. Alarm settings are not administrative details to be left at factory defaults or derived from simplistic rules of thumb. They are central to whether a monitoring programme enhances safety or erodes it. Documenting the rationale ensures setpoints can be defended, reviewed, and improved as circumstances change.

4. When the Language Gets in the Way: A Case for Clearer Terminology

Gas detection technology has never been more capable. Modern instruments calculate instantaneous concentrations, rolling short-term averages, and cumulative exposure across an entire shift. The mathematics behind these calculations is well established, technically robust, and grounded in decades of occupational hygiene science.

Yet despite this technical maturity, persistent confusion remains in how gas detector information is interpreted and acted upon in the field. This confusion does not stem from faulty calculations or inadequate standards; it stems from language. The gas detection industry has unintentionally reused exposure-assessment terminology in contexts where it no longer serves its original purpose. By using the same labels, TWA, STEL, Low, High, to describe both exposure metrics and real-time decision triggers, the distinction between measurement and action becomes blurred.

4.1: Gas detectors now perform two distinct functions

Modern gas detectors perform two distinct functions simultaneously. First, they prompt action in real time, alerting users when conditions change, worsen, or become immediately dangerous. Second, they measure exposure behaviour over time, calculating running time-weighted averages and rolling short-term averages using established formulas. Those two functions are both legitimate and essential, but they are not the same thing. Using identical language to describe both creates ambiguity between measurement and decision-making.

4.2: The calculations are not the problem

Removing TWA and STEL from gas detectors would not improve safety, in many cases it would reduce visibility. When correctly implemented, a running TWA provides meaningful insight into cumulative exposure, a rolling short-term calculation highlights periods of elevated short-term exposure, and both can support better exposure management for dose-driven hazards. The problem arises when exposure-assessment language, designed to evaluate health risk over defined timeframes, is used to describe real-time alarm conditions that are meant to trigger immediate action.

4.3: How terminology shapes behaviour under pressure

Words influence behaviour, particularly under pressure. Terms like TWA and STEL carry strong associations in occupational hygiene: compliance, limits, acceptability, averaging logic. When those terms appear directly on a worker's gas detector screen, alongside instantaneous alarms labelled 'Low' and 'High,' users are subtly encouraged to interpret what they see through a compliance lens rather than a decision-making one.

Over time, this often leads to predictable behaviours: short-term peaks are rationalised because the average appears acceptable; alarm conditions are debated rather than acted upon; extended shifts produce tolerance rather than earlier intervention; and acute hazards are mentally treated as cumulative ones. None of these behaviours result from errors or incompetence. They are logical responses to ambiguous communication. When instrument language implies assessment, users behave as assessors, not as decision-makers.

4.4: Hazard type and the limits of averaged language

This distinction becomes critical when considering different types of hazards. Carbon monoxide is primarily a cumulative, dose-driven hazard. A rising running average genuinely matters; trend recognition helps prevent carboxyhaemoglobin accumulation. Exposure indicators are operationally useful for this substance. Hydrogen sulphide, by contrast, is an acute, peak-driven hazard. Short concentration spikes can incapacitate. Averaging logic is largely irrelevant in the immediate moment. For this gas, instantaneous alarms dominate decision-making and cumulative metrics are secondary.

Yet both gases are commonly presented on detector displays with the same language: TWA, STEL, Low, High. The toxicology differs, the decision context differs, but the instrument language does not.

4.5: A proposed terminology reform

A clearer model begins by explicitly separating what the detector is calculating from what the detector is asking the user to do. Under this model, the mathematics stays the same, but the labels change to reflect purpose.

For exposure indicators, the following replacements are proposed:

- TWA (running) - becomes Cumulative Exposure Indicator (CEI) - calculated exactly as a traditional TWA, signalling that exposure is increasing over time and early intervention may be warranted.
- STEL - (rolling 15-minute) becomes Short-Term Exposure Alert (STEA) - calculated exactly as a traditional STEL, signalling that short-term exposure is elevated and task control should be considered.

For instantaneous alarm setpoints:

- 'Low' becomes Early Warning Level (EWL) - indicating a deviation from normal conditions and prompting early investigation or corrective action before the situation escalates.
- 'High' becomes Action Level (AL) - indicating a dangerous condition requiring immediate response, such as stopping work, withdrawing from the area, or initiating emergency procedures.

These names remove compliance ambiguity and describe what the user is expected to do, rather than implying a comparative assessment against a health-based limit.

A common objection to changing detector terminology is that users are already familiar with labels such as TWA and STEL. However, familiarity does not guarantee correct interpretation. Where established terminology repeatedly encourages users to treat real-time alarms as compliance thresholds, preserving that language for the sake of continuity risks reinforcing the very behaviours that undermine timely protective action.

4.6: Alignment with exposure standards remains intact

A natural concern is whether renaming alarms and indicators weakens alignment with exposure standards. In practice, it strengthens it. Exposure limits remain authoritative benchmarks for assessment, compliance, and health risk management. What changes is that their language is no longer misapplied to real-time decision cues. This is not a revolutionary departure from existing practice, it is a verbal correction that allows the science to do what it has always done: protect people, more effectively.

5. Sensor Reading, Resolution and the '10% of the WEL' Question

As WELs move downward and expectations of direct-reading gas monitors increase, a specific phrase appears repeatedly in procurement discussions and monitoring programme design: that the monitor readout should be able to 'show a value that has a resolution that is 10% of the WEL.' Although the phrase sounds clear, it commonly compresses several different technical ideas into one. In one conversation it may refer to low-end detectability; in another, to quantification or reporting capability; and in many cases it reflects a broader desire for confidence that the monitor remains useful as exposure limits decrease.

The problem is that the phrase is frequently applied without first identifying what job the monitor is being asked to do. If the purpose is immediate warning and worker action, the relevant performance requirement is not necessarily the same as if the purpose is cumulative exposure assessment, long-shift trend review, or compliance-oriented interpretation. This distinction matters because display logic, alarm logic, and exposure metrics are not the same thing and confusion arises when they are treated as though they are.

5.1: Exposure metrics are not interchangeable

Safe Work Australia's interpretive guidance makes a foundational point that is often overlooked: the eight-hour TWA, the STEL, and peak limitation are different exposure constructs serving different purposes. The TWA is the average airborne concentration calculated over a normal eight-hour working day. The STEL is a 15-minute time-weighted maximum average concentration. Peak limitation applies where concentration must not exceed a prescribed maximum over the shortest analytically practicable period. A STEL must not be exceeded even where the eight-hour TWA remains acceptable.

This distinction is critical because the numbers presented by a real-time monitor do not all answer the same question. The live or current reading is principally concerned with what is happening now. The STEL addresses recent short-duration exposure. The TWA addresses cumulative exposure over the shift. Once that separation is accepted, it becomes much harder to justify treating the displayed TWA as simply another form of instantaneous alarm indicator.

5.2: The TWA as a lagging metric, not a live signal

One of the most persistent practical errors in direct-reading monitoring is the treatment of the TWA field as though it describes present atmospheric conditions. Users watch the TWA rise and infer that the atmosphere has suddenly become hazardous. They see it remain low and infer that current conditions are acceptable. Yet a TWA is, by definition, a cumulative average, a lagging metric, not a real-time one. A short excursion may occur while the TWA

remains modest, and the TWA may remain elevated long after present conditions have improved. That is not a flaw in the TWA; it is the consequence of what a TWA is.

This interpretive mistake often drives the debate about display resolution. Once the TWA is mentally repurposed as a near-real-time decision signal, users naturally begin to demand finer steps, more decimal places, and earlier movement around low thresholds. But much of that demand reflects an attempt to use the wrong metric for the wrong purpose. If the immediate protective role is already being carried by properly configured live alarms, the TWA does not need to perform as a pseudo-instantaneous warning channel.

5.3: Why a blanket '10% of the WEL' sensor resolution rule is weak for alarming

A specification such as 'the sensor/display must have resolution equal to 10% of the WEL' can sound rigorous, but for the alarming function it is often the wrong requirement. Alarming is not principally about whether the sensor can display an arbitrary fraction of a cumulative exposure limit. It is about whether the monitor will provide a warning at the right point, with enough time for a defined protective response, and with response behaviour suited to the health outcome being managed.

OSHA treats reporting limit, working range, and response time as separate performance factors. For alarms, what matters is whether the monitor works reliably at the chosen alarm level and responds quickly enough to support the required action. A monitor could resolve low concentrations yet still be operationally poor for alarming if its response is too slow, its alarm threshold is poorly chosen, or its warning does not provide time for meaningful intervention. Conversely, a monitor can be effective for alarming even where its low-end visible resolution is coarser than one-tenth of the WEL, provided the alarm logic is appropriate to the risk.

For the alarming function, monitor performance at the selected alarm threshold, including response time, stability, and reliability is more important than whether the display can show an arbitrary fraction of an eight-hour exposure limit. Low-end resolution may be critical for exposure assessment and reporting, but it does not automatically define alarm suitability.

5.4: Where the low-end concern remains legitimate

Rejecting the blanket alarm requirement does not mean rejecting the low-end concern altogether. BOHS guidance on testing compliance with occupational exposure limits states that, wherever possible, the analytical method and sample volume should be selected so that the limit of quantification is below $0.1 \times \text{OEL}$. That benchmark matters for exposure assessment and compliance-oriented interpretation. OSHA's direct-reading framework also validates methods with explicit attention to the low end of the range, through concepts such as reporting limit and low-concentration testing.

The key issue is therefore not whether 10% of the WEL matters in the abstract, but what purpose it is being invoked for. Low-end capability may be highly relevant for trend analysis, demonstrating that exposure is comfortably below a limit, evaluating cumulative shift exposure, or supporting compliance-oriented decisions. What it does not automatically do is define the correct specification for the real-time alarm function.

5.5: Why visible 10% resolution of the WEL on the TWA screen is not the wrong criteria

Requiring the TWA display to visibly show a resolution of 10% of the WEL (for the chemical of interest) is misguided. A TWA is a time-weighted average, not an instantaneous concentration. By its nature, an averaged value does not need to mirror the visible increment of the live reading to be meaningful. The TWA is a cumulative exposure metric, and its significance lies in what it represents over time, not in whether its screen presentation matches a preferred decimal place.

Once live alarms are properly configured for immediate protection, the case for demanding visible 10%-of-WEL resolution on the TWA screen becomes weaker still. The TWA no longer needs to act like a live warning display, because the live channel is already performing that task. The absence of an extra visible decimal place may be frustrating from a user-interface perspective, but it is not evidence that the TWA is invalid or that the alarming strategy is inadequate.

5.6: Role clarity over decimal places

Much of the practical confusion surrounding real-time gas monitors comes from asking one number on the screen to do too many jobs. Users may want the monitor to tell them what they are breathing right now, whether a short-term excursion has occurred, whether cumulative exposure is building, and whether future compliance risk is emerging. No single value can do all of that equally well.

A more coherent model is straightforward: the live reading and live alarm setpoints should be used for immediate operational response; short-term averaging logic should be used for short-term exposure interpretation where relevant; and the TWA should be used for cumulative shift exposure context. Once those roles are kept separate, both recurring demands discussed in this section soften considerably, the sensor no longer needs to be judged by a universal '10% of the WEL' alarm rule, and the TWA screen no longer needs to be judged by whether it visibly displays one-tenth of the limit.

5.7: A better approach to specifying monitor requirements

A more defensible specification approach separates the protective function from the assessment function. For the protective function, the requirement should be that the monitor provide reliable and timely alarming at selected action thresholds, with response characteristics appropriate to the hazard and operating environment. For the assessment function, the requirement should separately address whatever low-end capability is needed for trend review, cumulative exposure interpretation, or compliance-oriented evaluation.

This language is more precise, more useful, and more consistent with the way OSHA, BOHS, and Safe Work Australia frame these issues. It also helps correct the widespread misuse of the word 'resolution,' which in practice is used interchangeably to mean display increment, reporting limit, quantification capability, or confidence near a decision point. Once these are separated, the focus shifts away from decimal places and onto the real question: whether the instrument supports the decision it is meant to inform.

6. Extended Work Shifts and the Consequences of Misapplied Alarm Logic

Extended work shifts represent one of the most practical contexts in which the distinction between exposure assessment and real-time decision-making becomes critically important. In many industries, work patterns have moved well beyond the traditional eight-hour working day, with ten- to twelve-hour shifts and compressed rosters now common. From an occupational hygiene perspective, this shift in working patterns is well understood to increase cumulative exposure and reduce physiological recovery time. Models such as Brief and Scala, as well as the Quebec approach, have been developed to assist in interpreting exposure under these conditions by adjusting acceptable exposure levels to reflect increased duration.

These models are both appropriate and valuable within the context of exposure assessment. However, difficulties arise when the logic underpinning these approaches is applied, either explicitly or implicitly, to real-time alarm behaviour on gas detection instruments.

6.1: Misapplication of exposure-based logic to real-time decisions

When gas detector readings are presented using exposure assessment terminology, particularly time-weighted averages and short-term exposure limits, there is a natural tendency to interpret these values as defining permissible exposure for the duration of the shift. Under extended work conditions, this often results in a subtle but important reframing of the problem. Rather than considering when intervention should occur, attention shifts toward how much exposure can be tolerated within an adjusted framework.

This shift in interpretation introduces several risks. Intervention may be delayed because exposure is perceived to remain within adjusted limits, even as conditions deteriorate. At the same time, the absence of alarm conditions can create a sense of reassurance that exposure remains acceptable, despite the accumulation of dose over time. These outcomes are not the result of poor practice, but rather a predictable consequence of using assessment-based language to guide operational decisions.

6.2: Reaffirming the core principle

The correct principle is straightforward, but frequently obscured in practice. Extended work shifts do not change what is hazardous; they change how early intervention should occur. The toxicological properties of a substance remain unchanged regardless of the duration of exposure. What does change is the accumulation of dose and the reduction in margin for error. As a result, hazards that are driven by cumulative exposure require earlier control, while hazards characterised by acute toxicity remain governed by instantaneous conditions that demand immediate response.

6.3: Separating indicators from alarms

This distinction is difficult to maintain when the same terminology is used to describe both exposure metrics and alarm conditions. A clearer approach emerges when exposure indicators are separated conceptually and linguistically from operational alarms. Under such a framework, values derived from time-weighted average and short-term exposure calculations are presented as indicators of exposure behaviour over time, while alarm setpoints are framed as decision triggers that define when action is required. This separation reinforces the appropriate behavioural response by ensuring that indicators inform awareness, while alarms prompt intervention.

6.4: Worked example: Carbon Monoxide (CO)

The practical implications of this approach can be illustrated through representative examples.

Carbon monoxide provides a clear example of a cumulative hazard. The toxic effects of carbon monoxide are driven primarily by the accumulation of carboxyhaemoglobin in the bloodstream, making cumulative exposure over time the dominant risk factor. In a twelve-hour shift environment, relatively low but sustained concentrations may not immediately trigger an alarm associated with dangerous conditions. However, a running exposure indicator derived from the time-weighted average calculation will demonstrate a progressive increase in cumulative exposure. When interpreted through a traditional lens, the absence of an alarm may be taken as confirmation that conditions remain acceptable. In contrast, when the same information is presented as an exposure indicator, increasing values can be recognised as evidence of deteriorating control. This allows early intervention, such as improving ventilation or modifying work practices, to occur before cumulative dose becomes significant. Importantly, this improvement in response is achieved without any change to the underlying calculation.

6.5: Worked example: Hydrogen Sulphide (H₂S)

Hydrogen sulphide presents a fundamentally different case. As an acutely toxic gas capable of causing rapid incapacitation at elevated concentrations, hydrogen sulphide is governed by peak exposure rather than cumulative dose. In this context, extended work shifts do not alter the nature of the hazard. A short-term increase in concentration remains dangerous regardless of whether the shift is eight hours or twelve. When exposure assessment terminology is used to interpret such conditions, there is a risk that short-term spikes may be rationalised if time-weighted or short-term average values remain within perceived limits. By contrast, when alarm conditions are clearly framed as decision triggers, instantaneous responses dominate behaviour. An Action Level condition is interpreted unambiguously as requiring immediate withdrawal, while exposure indicators provide context for subsequent review rather than influencing the immediate response. This prevents the inappropriate application of averaging logic in a scenario where it has little relevance.

6.6: Worked example: Nitrogen Dioxide (NO₂)

Nitrogen dioxide represents a more complex case, exhibiting both acute irritant properties and cumulative exposure characteristics. In extended shift environments, moderate but sustained concentrations may contribute to cumulative exposure, while short-term increases may produce immediate respiratory effects. When interpreted using traditional terminology, users may attempt to reconcile these competing aspects through time-weighted and short-term averages, leading to uncertainty regarding the appropriate course of action. Under a framework that separates indicators from alarms, exposure values can be understood as reflecting both cumulative and short-term behaviour, while alarm conditions provide clear direction regarding when to intervene. Early Warning Levels prompt control measures as concentrations rise, while Action Levels define conditions requiring immediate response. This approach allows both aspects of the hazard to be managed without requiring real-time interpretation of multiple exposure metrics.

6.7: Implications for practice

These examples demonstrate that extended work shifts do not introduce new hazards but rather amplify the consequences of how existing hazards are interpreted. Where exposure assessment language is used to guide operational decisions, there is a consistent tendency to tolerate exposure for longer than intended and to delay intervention. Conversely, when exposure calculations are clearly presented as indicators and alarm systems are explicitly framed as decision triggers, the appropriate response becomes more intuitive and consistent across different hazard types.

7. Conclusion

Real-time gas monitoring is at its most powerful when it is used to inform decisions rather than simply generate numbers. The four themes explored in this paper, sensor capability and alarm function, alarm-setting philosophy, the language of gas detection, and sensor resolution requirements, each reflect the same underlying challenge: the gap between what direct-reading instruments are capable of measuring and what users are equipped to do with that information.

Several practical principles emerge from this analysis. Exposure limits and alarm setpoints serve fundamentally different purposes and should never be conflated. Alarm-setting is a risk management exercise grounded in toxicology and instrument behaviour, not a mathematical transformation of averaging criteria. The language used on gas detector displays shapes the decisions users make often in ways that undermine protection rather than enhance it. And specifications for monitor performance must be matched to the function the instrument is being asked to perform.

The uncomfortable truth is that no standard, regulator, or manufacturer can provide a single set of alarm values or performance thresholds suited to every workplace and every hazard. That responsibility rests with practitioners. It requires judgement, an understanding of measurement uncertainty, and a willingness to move beyond rules of thumb.

Several practical implications follow from this analysis. Alarm setpoints should be treated as documented risk management decisions rather than administrative defaults or mathematical transformations of exposure limits. Detector displays and associated training should reinforce action-oriented interpretation rather than compliance-oriented comparison.

In an era where real-time data is abundant, professional insight remains the most important control of all. Getting gas detection right, from alarm philosophy to display language to procurement specifications is not about being conservative or permissive. It is about making deliberate, informed decisions.

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